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INDIANS' RIGHT TO FISH: THE BACKGROUND,
IMPACT, AND LEGACY OF UNITED STATES V.
WASHINGTON
Shannon Bentley*
L Introduction
From time immemorial, salmon has occupied a dominant position
in the culture of native coastal communities. This abundant resource
not only provided Washington Indians with a food source' but was
also a basis for their trading economy 2 a means for maintaining social
stratification, and a focal point of religion, and ceremony. 3 Salmon
was at the very core of the aboriginal way of life. The smoked and
dried fish were an important trading commodity, traded in high volume
and over extensive geographic regions. Often the Indians bartered the
fish for lumber, blankets, ceremonial masks, and later for kettles and
guns .4
Along with their economic importance, anadromous 5 species were
central to Indian culture. The harvesting season fostered social cohesion
within the loosely-knit tribal groups by delegating specific harvesting
functions to each community member. No one was overlooked: men
caught the fish, women cleaned and smoked them, and children gath-
ered firewood and helped clean the fish.6 To these people, "fish were
* Tribal Code Writer, Northwest Intertribal Court System, Washington State.
LL.M., University of Washington; LL.B., University of British Columbia.
1. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 905-06 (D. Or. 1969), aff'd, 529 F.2d
570 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting aboriginal use of Columbia River salmon). See also AMERICAN
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCK-
LESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 3 (1970).
2. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350, 358, 366-67 (W.D. Wash.
1974) (Washington 1), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086
(1976); see also Albion Gile, Note on Columbia River Salmon, 56 OR. HIsT. Q. 140,
142 (1955).
3. CHIEF MARTIN J. SAMPSON, INDIANS OF SKAGIT COUNTY 7 (1972).
4. Id. at 8.
5. Anadromous fish are those which spawn in fresh water, migrate to the ocean
for the better part of their life cycle, and then return after a period of roughly two to
five years to the rivers and streams of their origin to renew the cycle. These three stages
of the life cycle characterize and differentiate anadromous fish from all other species.
See Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 405.
6. For background information on traditional economic and social life of North-
west tribes, see HERMAN K. HAEBERLIN & ERNA GUNTHER, THE INDIANS OF PUGET
SOUND (1973); United States Indian Claims Commission volumes in the American Indian
Ethnohistory series published on Northwest tribes by Garland Press (New York); and
WAYNE SUTTLES, COAST SALISH ESSAYS (1987). See also supra notes 1-3.
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... not much less necessary than the atmosphere they breathed." 7
With the colonization of the western United States, and with the white
man's inexorable push west, came the alteration of native peoples'
control of the fishery and the commercial harvesting of salmon.
In the mid-nineteenth century Congress appointed Isaac Ingalls Stev-
ens to serve as governor of what is now Washington State and as
superintendent of Indian Affairs for that region. 8 Stevens' job was to
obtain as much of the Indian land as possible. Within one year (1854)
Stevens had concluded treaty negotiations with more than 17,000
Indians, giving the new Washington Territory title to more than
64,000,000 acres of Indian land.9
Initially, these treaties did not have any practical effect or impact
on the Indians. Few conflicts arose, for there was enough salmon and
land for everyone. "Indeed, for a number of years white and Indian
fishermen worked closely in harvesting the fish from the Columbia
River."' 0 Such a copacetic situation did not last for long.
As the gold rush attracted new frontiersmen, it attracted all the
necessary ingredients for conflict:
Land that had once belonged to the Indians, and was deeded
to the Territory under the Stevens treaties, eventually fell
into the hands of white salmon fishermen, who took no
great delight in seeing a group of Indians regularly march
across private property to plant their poles and nets in the
now highly valuable "usual and accustomed" fishing places."
As a result, the initial problem Indians in Washington faced was how
to regain access to the fish.
Today, conflict among salmon-user groups has escalated as each
sector of the salmon industry grows in its determination not to have
a lesser share of a dwindling resource. Annual reductions in allowable
catch, the economically insupportable number of salmon fishing vessels
in the waters off the west coast of the United States, and the com-
petition between United States, Canada, and Japanese fishers, between
Indians and non-Indians, between sport and commercial fishers, be-
tween trollers and gill-netteids, have all combined to undermine the
economic viability of salmon fisheries. Fishery management problems
are now chronic and the resource allocation situation has been de-
7. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
8. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 18.
9. Id. at 19.
10. Gile, supra note 2, at 141.
11. Jack L. Landau, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific
Northwest, 10 ENVTL. L. 413, 419-20 (1980).
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scribed, in a masterpiece of understatement, as "tense." In the words
of the Director of the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, salmon
management has become such that "the measure of a good decision
*.. is one which makes everyone equally mad."'' 2
In Washington State the most heated and protracted fishing conflicts
have been the battles between Indian and non-Indian fishers. Western
Washington tribes, after decades of suffering the effects of being
pushed out of the mainstream fishing economy, chose to fight back.
Some of the "leaders said we can either stay in these concentration
camps supported by the government or we can take risks and look
for opportunities.''13
The risk-taking activities first started in the mid-1950s with "fish-
ins" - fishing in defiance of state law but in accordance with Indian
interpretation of the treaties. 14 Open protests against restrictive state
regulations by the Nisqually, Puyallup, and Muckleshoot Tribes in the
1960s led to arrests and confiscation of the tribes' gear. Tension
mounted as the pace and the intensity of the confrontations increased.
The explosive atmosphere of this period coupled with the "long years
of non-understanding of Indian life by whites made it nearly impossible
for either side to talk to each other.' '15 A negotiated settlement was
out of the question.
The conflict soon moved from the water to the courtroom. The first
series of cases litigated in this region helped significantly to clarify the
issues, 16 but it was Judge Boldt's landmark decision in United States
v. Washington (Washington 1)'" that marked the turning point. Judge
Boldt interpreted the treaties as securing for the tribes the right to
50% of the allowable catch.
II. Scope of Study
Commencing with Washington I, this article traces how the treaty
tribes in western Washington reestablished their right to harvest salmon
12. John R. Donaldson, Oregon's Salmon Future, in SCIENCE, POLMCS AND FIsHING
39 (N. Krant ed., 1981).
13. Interview with Terry Williams, Director of Fisheries Department, Tulalip Tribe
and Commissioners, Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission (Apr. 18, 1990).
14. FAYE G. CoHEN, TREATis ON TRIAL - THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER
NORTHXVEST INDiAN FISHING RIGHTS 65 (1986).
15. Id. at 107 n.8.
16. The Puyallup trilogy consists of Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391
U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup 1), Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44
(1973) (Puyallup I1), and Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977)
(Puyallup III). The cases ultimately held that 45% of the harvestable natural steelhead
run on the Puyallup River was available for the taking by the treaty Indians' net fishery
and 55% by the non-Indian sport fishery. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or.
1969), affirmed the Columbia River treaty tribes' right to a fair and equitable portion
of the fish going through their usual and accustomed fishing places.
17. 384 F. Sum). 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
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under the treaties signed with Governor Stevens in the middle of the
nineteenth century. United States v. Washington8 was not the first
case to deal with Indian treaty fishing rights; litigation in this area
occurred for years. Washington I has been selected as the starting
point of this article because, while commentators at that time heralded
it as the final act in a long and bloody battle, Judge Boldt'4 pivotal
decision instead ignited a new round of controversy-and conflict. The
courtroom battle would soon be identified as simply the next stage in
the ongoing fight for fishing rights.
In the sixteen years since Judge Boldt promulgated his decision, new
conflicts between Indians and non-Indians have emerged as old con-
flicts are resolved. The second part of this article surveys and explains
the nature of these current conflicts that plague the Indian fishers of
western Washington. Currently, there are fifteen subproceedings pend-
ing and the tribes have further identified nine general areas where the
tribes anticipate litigation. This new round of litigation differs from
the earlier, post-Boldt cases in that a greater percentage of these new
disputes are between tribes, as opposed to Indian versus non-Indian.
Finally, this article concludes with a critical evaluation of United States
v. Washington, its repercussions, and its impact on the treaty tribes
and the fishery resource.
The ultimate aim of this article is twofold. First, by surveying
litigation that is anticipated or pending under the continuing jurisdic-
tion of the district courts, the article serves as an update on the current
status of Indian treaty fishing rights in western Washington. Second,
by treating Judge Boldt's decision together with all the connected and
resulting litigation as a case study, the article identifies the further
reaching effects and implications that judicially resolved treaty rights
disputes generate.
III. United States v. Washington
On September 18, 1970, the United States, on behalf of seven treaty
tribes (Puyallup, Nisqually, Muckleshoot, Skokomish, Makah, Qui-
leute, and Hoh),19 filed a complaint against Washington State seeking
a declaratory judgment concerning protection of off-reservation treaty-
right fishing and injunctive relief to provide enforcement of those
rights.20 The geographical setting is that portion of Washington State
18. The use of United States v. Washington refers to both Washington I, 584 F.
Supp. 12 (W.D. Wash. 1974), and Washington II, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash.
1980).
19. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 327.
20. These tribes were later joined by the Lummi Tribe, Quinalt Tribe, Sauk-Suiattle
Tribe, Squaxin Island Tribe, Stillaguamish Tribe, Upper Skagit River Tribe, and the
Yakima Nation. Eventually twenty-one tribes were included as parties.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/2
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west of the Cascade Mountains and north of the Columbia River
drainage area, and includes the American portion of the Puget Sound
watershed, the Olympic Peninsula watersheds north of the Grays Har-
bor watershed, and the off-shore waters adjacent to those areas. 21
Before the case came to trial, the parties agreed to divide the issues
into two phases. Phase I (Washington 1) dealt with the issue of whether
Indians had treaty rights to fish off their reservations, and if so,
whether the treaties reserved to the tribes a specific percentage of fish.
Phase II (Washington II) then considered whether hatchery-bred fish
and artificially-propagated fish would be included in calculating the
Indian allocation and whether the treaties guaranteed the continued
protection of the salmon against destruction of the salmon's habitat. 2
United States v. Washington was not only very complicated from a
legal perspective, but it also came to court in a climate of heated
political antagonism. The resulting decision had a far-reaching impact
on all the parties and could potentially restructure tribal societies. The
conflict exerted tremendous pressure on the court, a type of pressure
with which judges are usually not confronted. Nevertheless, Senior
District Court Judge George H. Boldt intended to
determine every issue of fact and law presented and, at long
last, thereby finally settle, either in his decision or on appeal
thereof, as many as possible of the divisive problems of
treaty right fishing which for so long have plagued all of
the citizens of this area, and still do.?
A. Phase I
1. District Court Decision
Judge Boldt determined that all the legal issues and factual deter-
minations must be characterized and evaluated according to the treaty
language reserving fishing rights to the tribes. 24 Judge Boldt held that
the treaty itself must be interpreted in the "spirit and manner" directed
by the Supreme Court:
And we have said we will construe a treaty with the Indians
as "that unlettered people" understood it, and "as justice
and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by
the strong over those to whom they owe care and protec-
21. Washington 1, 384 F. Supp. at 328.
22. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 190 (V.D. Wash. 1980)
(Washington HI).
23. Washington 1, 384 F. Supp. at 330.
24. See appendix I of this article for the full text of Treaty of Medicine Creek,
Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisqually, et. al., 10 Stat. 1132.
No. 1]
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tion," and counterpoise the inequality "by the superior
justice which looks only to the substance of the right,
without regard to the technical rules."' u
Judge Boldt's interpretation of the following clause not only pro-
tected and secured for Indians the right to fish off the reservation,
but his interpretation also reserved for the tribes a specific amount of
the fish. All the treaties Isaac Stevens signed with the western Wash-
ington tribes contained essentially the same critical provision. That
provision in the Medicine Creek Treaty read, "The right of taking
fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further
secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the terri-
tory .... "26
Aided by the use of a dictionary, Judge Boldt made his most far-
reaching ruling. He held that the treaty provision did indeed provide
the treaty tribes with a treaty-based right to fish and also reserved a
specific amount of fish for the tribes. Judge Boldt concluded that 'in
common with' means sharing equally the opportunity to take fish at
'usual and accustomed grounds and stations;' therefore, nontreaty
fishermen shall have the opportunity to take up to 50% of the har-
vestable number of fish ... and treaty right fishermen shall have the
opportunity to take up to the same percentage of harvestable
fish . . "27
Judge Boldt also called for an equitable adjustment to be determined
from time to time. This adjustment was meant to augment the tribes'
25. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (citing Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886); Jones v. Mechan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)). Judge Boldt
also identified other Supreme Court decisions that employed the same approach to
treaty interpretation. Washington 1, 384 F. Supp. at 331. See Tulee v. Washington, 315
U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198 (1919); Jones,
175 U.S. at 11; Choctaw Nation, 119 U.S. at 27-28; The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 737, 760 (1866); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552-62 (1832);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 14-20 (1831).
26. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 349; see Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26,
1854, U.S.-Nisqually et al., 10 Stat. 1132. The other treaties Isaac Stevens, Governor
and Indian Agent of the Washington Territory in the 1850s, negotiated were: Treaty of
Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, U.S.-Dwamish et al., 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Olympia,
July 1, 1855 & Jan. 25, 1856, U.S.-Quinaielts, 12 Stat. 971; Treaty of Point No Point,
Jan. 26, 1855, U.S.-S'Klallams, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, U.S.-
Makah, 12 Stat. 939.
27. Washington 1, 384 F. Supp. at 343 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).
Excluded from this 50-50 sharing formula were: (1) fish that Indians catch on reserva-
tions; (2) fish taken at off-reservation sites other than the tribes' usual and accustomed
fishing grounds; (3) fish that Indians catch for ceremonial and subsistence needs; and
(4) fish that are necessary for spawning escapement. Id. Thus, the total population of
fish in these four categories are to be subtracted from the total anticipated run before
the size of the harvestable run can be determined.
[Vol. 17
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share and compensate them for the "substantially disproportionate"
numbers of fish caught offshore by non-treaty fishermen that would
have otherwise passed through the tribes' fishing grounds.2"
The Washington I court also ruled on the regulatory powers of the
state and the tribes, as well as the enforcement and management of
fishing regulations. Judge Boldt explained that since the treaty tribes'
right to take "anadromous fish arises from a treaty with the United
States, that right is preserved and protected under the supreme law of
the land, does not depend on State law, is distinct from rights or
privileges held by others, and may not be qualified by any action of
the State." 29
Recognizing that in the past the state had unlawfully restricted Indian
fishing under the guise of "conservation regulations," Judge Boldt
was careful to delineate exactly how, when, and why the state could
step in and regulate the Indians' treaty right to fish. The state is
authorized to regulate the fishery only for conservation purposes aimed
to preserve and maintain the resource. Such regulations must not
discriminate against the treaty tribes' right to fish, must meet appro-
priate standards of substantive and procedural due process, and the
state must show that its conservation objective could not be met by
restricting non-Indian fishermen.30
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Boldt's decision and the propriety
of the district court's continuing involvement in the case.3' With this
approbation the case was remanded to the district court so that the
court could maintain continuing jurisdiction. As District Judge Burns
recognized, this affirmation "also involves ratification of the role of
the district judge as a 'perpetual fishmaster."' 3 2 While this supervision
is not the usual role of a judge, this case is not typical. Washington
State's failure to implement the decision coupled with
the history set forth in the [Department of Game v. Puyallup
Tribe"] and [State v. Antoine 4] cases, among others, make
it crystal clear that it has been the recalcitrance of Wash-
ington State officials (and their vocal non-Indian commer-
cial and sports fishing allies) which produced the denial of
Indian rights requiring intervention by the district court.
28. Id. at 343-44.
29. Id. at 407.
30. Id. at 407-08.
31. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (Washington II).
32. Id. at 693 (Burns, J., concurring).
33. 422 P.2d 754 (Wash. 1967), aff'd and remanded, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
34. 511 P.2d 1351 (Wash. 1973) (en banc), rev'd, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
No. 1]
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This responsibility should neither escape notice nor be for-
gotten.35
Finally, the United States Supreme Court declined to review Washing-
ton ,,36 thus ensuring that Judge Boldt's decision was the law of the
land.
A law is of little use if it is not enforced. Because county prosecutors
and judges dismissed almost all citations, illegal fishing on a grand
scale continued and even increased. The situation was marked by
confrontation and violence between Indians and non-Indians.
In an attempt to bring some order to this chaos, Judge Boldt
established the Fisheries Advisory Board (FAB), to resolve disputes as
they arose and before they reached court. The FAB consisted of three
individuals: one tribal representative, one state representative, and a
chairperson.37 The chairperson's role was to encourage negotiated
agreements, and if the situation arose where the parties could not
agree, the chairperson recommended a solution. While this chairperson
remained unchanged, both the tribal and state representative changed
depending on the issues and parties involved in a particular dispute.
Attempts to subvert the Washington I decision continued and cul-
minated in 1977 with two decisions handed down by the Washington
State Supreme Court: Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos38 and
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tol-
lefson.39
In Puget Sound Gillnetters, the petitioners, an individual and a
commercial fishing association, filed an action against the Washington
State Director of Fisheries seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the
director to restrict fishing regulations to those necessary for conser-
vation and to treat Indian and non-Indian fishermen equally. 0 The
Department of Fisheries, as respondent, was put in the position of
essentially arguing to uphold the ruling in Washington I - a decision
it clearly disliked. One has to wonder, then, if the respondent's case
was argued as vigorously as it should have been.
The state supreme court neither considered itself bound to follow
the decision of the Ninth Circuit, nor did it acknowledge that the
United States Supreme Court had denied certiorari. This was justified
by Judge Rosellini, writing for the majority: "Being cited no authority
35. Vashington II, 520 F.2d at 693 (Burns, J., concurring).
36. Washington v. United States, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
37. Dr. Richard Whitney, professor at the College of Fisheries at the University of
Washington, was appointed by Judge Boldt as the permanent chair.
38. 565 P.2d 1151 (Wash. 1977).
39. 571 P.2d 1373 (Wash. 1977).
40. Puget Sound Gillnetters, 565 P.2d at 1152.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/2
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for the proposition that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to construe Indian treaties - treaties which affect important
interests of the state - we adhere to our own interpretation of the
treaty. This interpretation we believe, results in fairness and justice to
all fishermen."
4
'
Judge Rosellini continued, holding that the Department of Fisheries
can only regulate fishing for conservation purposes and that equal
protection concepts prevented the allocation of fish "to any user of
the same class, that every fishermen in a class must be treated equally,
and that each should be given an equal opportunity to fish within
lawful statutes and regulations. ' 42
On November 23, 1977, six months after Puget Sound Gillnetters,
the same court handed down an almost identical decision. In Wash-
ington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 43
Judge Rosellini affirmed his earlier decision in Puget Sound Gillnetters
but with a more explicit rationale:
We hold that the director of the Department of Fisheries
of the State of Washington does not have the authority to
apportion fish to conform to the Federal District Court
decision, that the Federal District Court cannot compel a
state officer to act beyond his statutory authority, and that
the granting of more than 50 percent of the harvestable fish
to 0.28 percent of the population (treaty Indians) and less
than 50 percent to 2,243,069 non-Indian population, violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution. 4
This pronouncement left the Director of Fisheries in a very awkward
situation. If he followed this decision and failed to allocate the fish
between the Indian and non-Indian fishers, he would be in contempt
of the United States district court order. On the other hand, if the
Director did allocate the fish between the Indian and non-Indian
fishers, he would risk being in contempt of the Washington State
Supreme Court order.
It was here that Judge Boldt stepped in and assumed responsibility
for allocating fish to Indians and later to non-Indians. This authority
was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Puget Sound Gillnetters
Ass'n v. United States District Court,45 and his job as fishmaster
continued until 1978.
41. Id. at 1158.
42. Id. at 1159.
43. 571 P.2d 1373 (Wash. 1977).
44. Id. at 1378.
45. 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978).
No. 1]
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2. United States Supreme Court Decision
Almost five years after Judge Boldt's initial decision in Washington
I and two years after the United States Supreme Court denied certi-
orari, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review the case
because (1) the commercial fishermen's cases had been decided and
had created a clash between the state and the federal court systems -
a confrontation which the United States Supreme Court undoubtedly
viewed with concern; (2) the non-Indian commercial fishermen's de-
fiance of the Boldt decision had led to chaos; and (3) in a highly
unusual move, "the United States Justice Department - which had
brought United States v. Washington on behalf of the tribes - had
acquiesced to the state's request for review." 46
The United States Supreme Court, hoping to resolve the issue once
and for all, heard Washington v. Washington State Commercial Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel Ass'n47 together with Washington v. United States
(Washington 1)48 and Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States
District Court.49
In a 6-3 majority, the United States Supreme Court upheld virtually
all Judge Boldt's decisions and overruled the state court decisions as
contrary to the federal court orders.50 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, affirmed the 50-50 allocation but stated that this should be
viewed as a maximum ceiling, which would be reduced if tribal needs
could be satisfied by a lesser amount.5 ' The Supreme Court further
held that fish taken by Indians on their reservations should be included
in their 50% share, including fish taken by Indians for ceremonial and
subsistence needs.5 2
B. Phase II
1. District Court Decision
In August 1976 the plaintiffs formally commenced United States v.
Washington (Washington I). 53 A flurry of amended and supplemental
complaints, followed by answers and counterclaims, helped to narrow
and focus the issues. The first issue was whether hatchery-reared fish
were included in the tribes' allocation. The second issue was whether
the "federal treaty fishing right reserves to treaty tribes a right to have
46. COHEN, supra note 14, at 109.
47. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
48. Washington , 384 F. Supp. at 312.
49. 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978).
50. Washington State Commercial, 443 U.S. at 660.
51. Id. at 670, 685-86.
52. Id. at 688.
53. 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/2
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the fishery resource protected from adverse environmental actions or
inactions of the State of Washington."5 4
District Judge Orrick granted the tribes' motion for summary judg-
ment holding that fish reared in all hatcheries, Indian and non-Indian,
were to be included in the total fish allocation. Judge Orrick also
granted the tribes' motion for partial summary judgment holding that
the right of taking fish includes the right to preserve the supply of
fish by protecting the habitat. The court held that the treaty assures
the tribes something considerably more tangible than "merely the
chance ... occasionally to dip their nets into the territorial waters.""5
After all, the "most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right
to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken. '5 6 Judge Orrick
concluded that the treaties reserved a sufficient quantity of fish to
satisfy the tribes moderate living needs, but the tribes allocation would
be subject to a ceiling of 50% of the harvestable run.17
2. United States Court of Appeals Decision
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the hatchery summary judgment and
partially reversed the district court's environmental right ruling. 8 Judge
Sneed, writing for the court, found that the treaty terms implied a
duty on the state to take reasonable steps to protect the fish resource
from degradation. 9 The duty requires the state to take "reasonable
steps commensurate with State resources and abilities to preserve and
enhance the fishery." 60 Unfortunately, the court did not define "rea-
sonable steps," including whether or not past or present state habitat
protection efforts could be considered "reasonable."
The state petitioned for an en banc rehearing. Granting the rehear-
ing,61 the Ninth Circuit vacated its earlier opinion, and the case was
reargued to an eleven-judge en banc panel.62 In a per curiam opinion,
the court instructed the trial court to vacate its judgment regarding
the environmental aspect of the case. 63 The court thought it contrary
to the "exercise of sound judicial discretion" to issue a declaratory
judgment on the environmental issue at this time. Rather than use the
declaratory judgment procedure "to announce legal rules imprecise in
54. Id. at 194.
55. Id. at 203 (quoting Washington 1, 443 U.S. at 679).
56. Id. at 203.
57. Id. at 208.
58. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 1375.
60. Id. (footnote omitted).
61. 704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983).
62. 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
63. Id. at 1355.
No. 1]
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definition and uncertain in dimension," the court felt it prudent to
wait for another case where definite and concrete state actions are in
question so that "the measure of the State's obligation will depend
for its precise legal formulation on all of the facts presented by a
particular dispute.''65
The Washington II court affirmed the district court's judgment
granting a declaratory judgment on the hatchery fish issue. All fish
reared in hatcheries, whether Indian or non-Indian, were to be included
in the total fish to be allocated.
Four factors favored affirmance of the district court's decision to
include hatchery-fish: "(1) the lack of state ownership of the fish once
released; (2) the lack of any unjust enrichment of the Tribes; (3) the
fact that hatchery fish and natural fish are not distinguished for other
purposes; and (4) the mitigating function of the hatchery fish pro-
grams." The court found it only just and equitable that the hatchery
fish be included in the total number of fish subject to allocation.
Judges Sneed and Anderson, who also sat on the panel which initially
heard the case, concurred with the per curiam opinion, stating that
"[tihere comes a time, however, in a collegial body in which it is
better to reach an agreement that is tolerable by a majority than it is
to adhere to one's preferred position. This is such a time." '67
Judges Ferguson and Schroeder also concurred with the majority.
However, they would have vacated the district court's judgment per-
taining to the "environmental degradation issue because of the absence
of a case or controversy in the present posture of the litigation." 68
Judges Nelson, Skopil, and Norris concurred that hatchery fish are
fish within the meaning of the treaty clause but dissented from the
majority's statement of the proper standard of review. They concluded
that the district court properly invoked the mechanism of declaratory
relief on the environmental issue. "While it may be unable to resolve
all potential disputes between the parties, declaratory relief would
clarify and settle the legal relations in issue and would afford sub-
stantial relief from the uncertainty the parties face." 69 Judge Poole,
believing that the court was without jurisdiction to entertain this
appeal, dissented. 70
IV. Current Concerns - Current Conflict
Despite the United States Supreme Court's resounding affirmation
of Judge Boldt's decision, the conflict and controversy remained and
64. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1359.
67. Id. at 1360 (Sneed, J., concurring).
68. Id. (Ferguson, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 1365 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 1368 (Poole, J., dissenting).
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vigorous litigation continued. The district court settled most of the
disputes but many have reached the Ninth Circuit.7' Phillip E. Katzen,
staff attorney of Evergreen Legal Services, recalls that even toward
the end of 1983 there was no sign of a slowdown in the litigation,
and if anything, it was accelerating. 72 This occurrence was probably
of little surprise to Judge Boldt as the district court retained continuing
jurisdiction over United States v. Washington to determine further
issues that might arise.
Currently, there are fifteen subproceedings pending in the Ninth
Circuit.7" The tribes have further identified nine general areas where
litigation is possible or likely in the near future. It is important to
note that the parties to these disputes have changed. No longer are
these Indian versus non-Indian conflicts. The great majority of these
disputes are now either inter-tribal or intra-tribal.
A. Inter-Tribal and Intra-Tribal Conflicts
1. North-South Sound Treaty Allocation
The Nisqually, Squaxin Island, Puyallup, and Muckleshoot tribes,
located in the south Puget Sound region, are concerned that they will
be barred from harvesting the salmon that originate in their rivers and
streams. The salmon migrate north through Puget Sound into open
ocean where they live until they return to spawn in their natal streams
or river. While en route to the south Puget Sound rivers, the salmon
pass through the usual and accustomed fishing sites of most northern-
based tribes. This route concerns the south Puget Sound tribes.
Now that the north Puget Sound tribes have tremendous harvesting
capabilities, the south Puget Sound tribes are concerned that this
translates into a diminished or nonexistent harvest opportunity for
them. Vigorous harvesting activity in the north could lead to two
results detrimental to south Puget Sound tribal fishing interests. First,
the total Indian allocation could be reached by the north Puget Sound
tribes before the fish reach the south Puget Sound and before the
south Puget Sound tribes have an opportunity to harvest them. Second,
the runs bound for the streams and rivers in the south Puget Sound
71. See United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Washington, 642 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Washington, 645 F.2d
749 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Washington, 759
F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Washington, 761 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Washington, 761 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Washington,
764 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1985); United.States v. Washington, 774 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.
1985).
72. Interview with Mr. Phillip Katzen, Staff Attorney, Evergreen Legal Services
(Apr. 13, 1990).
73. Id.
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could be so heavily harvested by the activities of the north Puget
Sound tribes that the few returning spawners represent the minimum
escapement necessary to preserve the run and therefore must not be
harvested due to conservation concerns and constraints.
North-south Puget Sound allocation conflicts such as these are bound
to grow in frequency and severity. Only recently have the tribes become
capable of harvesting their total allocation. The Lummi Tribe, for
example, has dramatically increased its purse seine 4 fleet from two
vessels in 1974 when the district court handed down its decision in
Washington I to thirty-five in 1986. It is expected that their purse
seine fleet will continue to increase over the next eight years unless
the government imposes restrictions to limit entry.s
On September 8, 1986, the Nisqually, Squaxin Island, Puyallup, and
Muckleshoot tribes requested a determination of their treaty and eq-
uitable rights to shares of salmon originating from south Puget Sound.76
The court has signed an agreed order for mediation of this dispute.
The results of this mediation are still unknown.
2. Tribal Members Fishing Under the State Licenses
Treaty tribal members are not barred by the state from acquiring
state fishing licenses. A tribal member could conceivably fish on open
tribal fishing days as well as the open days set by the state. Terry
Williams, director of the Tulalip Fisheries Department, is concerned
because the fish caught by tribal members using state fishing licenses
still count against the total tribal allocation. "These fishermen are
stealing from the Indian fisherman that do not have state fishing
licenses ... they are double-dipping." 7 Double-dipping not only af-
fects Indian and non-Indian allocations, but also affects international
allocations as well. 78
The Tulalip Tribe and other tribes experiencing the same problem
have attempted to control this activity internally, but to no avail. The
Tulalip Tribe and the Swinomish Tribe now feel compelled to bring
this problem before the district court. Both the Tulalip Tribe and
74. A "purse seine" vessel sets a net that hangs perpendicular to the bottom. The
net is laid in a huge circle around a school of fish and then both ends are pulled in
simultaneously. The fish are trapped inside the circle and are drawn upwards and into
the boat.
75. Daniel L. Boxberger, The Lummi Indians and the Canadian/American Pacific
Salmon Treaty, 12 AM. INDIAN Q. 308-09 (1988).
76. Joint Tribal Statement Re: Status Conference of September 13, 1989, Subpro-
ceeding 86-5: North-South Sound Treaty Allocation, United States v. Washington Civ.
No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 18, 1970).
77. Interview with Terry Williams, Director of Fisheries Department, Tulalip Tribe
and Commissioner of Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission (Apr. 18, 1990).
78. Id.
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Swinomish Tribe are expected to file requests challenging the use of
state licenses by some members of some tribes to fish on days when
fishing is closed to tribal members.
3. Calls to Reevaluate the Boundaries of
Usual and Accustomed Fishing Sites
In the years following the Boldt decision, the Lummi Tribe's fleet
grew dramatically. The number of purse seine79 vessels increased from
two in 1974, to thirty-three in 1985. The number of skiff gill net 0
vessels increased from thirty-five in 1974 to over two hundred in 1985,
and the number of power gill net boats jumped from half a dozen in
1974 to over one hundred in 1985.81 This represents a jump from
forty-three vessels in 1974 to over 335 vessels in 1985. Not all treaty
tribes have developed their fishery in this way. Many of the tribes are
primarily restricted to terminal area fisheries and cannot develop the
more lucrative marine fishery.
The Lummi fishery is more valuable than many other tribes' fisheries
primarily because of its geographical location. The Strait of Juan de
Fuca falls within the Lummi usual and accustomed areas Lummi fishers
can choose to fish the more valuable Fraser River-bound sockeye runs
and ignore the Puget Sound chum runs. This leads to a large discrep-
ancy in harvesting opportunities and activities between some tribes.
"[Bjy 1985 Lummi was the strongest fishing tribe in the State of
Washington taking, in two previous years, close to half of the entire
allocation for the twenty-four Western Washington Treaty Tribes. ' 82
The Lummi generally take 90% of the treaty share of sockeye, even
though they only comprise 20% of the total Indian fleet. This uneven
distribution of the resource has generated animosity and conflict among
the treaty tribes.
On March 3, 1989, the Skokomish, Port Gamble Klallam, Lower
Elwa Klallam, and Jamestown Klallam tribes filed a request for de-
termination regarding the Lummi Tribes usual and accustomed fishing
sites. 3 These tribes are particularly interested as to whether or not the
Strait of Juan de Fuca, Discovery Bay, and Admiralty Inlet are
included in the Lummi usual and accustomed sites identified in Wash-
ington I.
79. See supra note 74.
80. A "gill net" vessel simply hangs a wall of mesh netting perpendicular to the
bottom. The net is laid in a straight line and is fastened to the bottom by stakes or an
anchor.
81. Joint Tribal Statement Re: Status Conference of September 13, 1989, at 303,
United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 18, 1970).
82. Id. at 302.
83. Id. at 10.
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B. State-Tribe Conflicts: The Fight for Shellfish
and Other Non-Anadromous Special
Shellfish resources have been a mainstay of coastal Indian society
and culture for thousands of years. A great variety of shellfish were
utilized for ceremonial, subsistence, and commercial purposes, but
mos: notable was the special role shellfish played as a crisis food.
Shellfish were always available as a readily accessible food source. If
a salmon run was depleted or wiped out, or an individual was no
longer able to obtain other foods, shellfish was used as the alternative
because it was always available and readily accessible. 4
The significance of shellfish to Indian culture was recognized by
Isaac Stevens and reserved in the treaties he drafted between 1854 and
1855. The pertinent clause reads, "The right of taking fish at usual
and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians,
in common with all citizens of the United States; . . . Provided,
however, that they shall not take shellfish from any beds staked or
cultivated by citizens." '85 No other treaties ratified with the United
States expressly reserve shellfish rights for the tribes.
The tribes' ability to harvest shellfish to satisfy their basic needs has
been radically truncated. This drastic result has been caused by a
combination of factors. First, the sale and lease of tidelands from the
state to private parties who refuse to permit access to Indians has
effectively eliminated these areas from tribal reach. State- and feder-
ally-owned tidelands are currently the only areas available to the
general public. Compared to the estimated 1,952 miles of shoreline in
Puget Sounds, San Juan Islands, and Strait of Juan De Fuca, the
remaining tidelands open to the public are limited to about twenty-
one miles . 6
Second, Indian harvest was further reduced by state policy and
legislation that limited shellfish harvests for any purpose. The state
was concerned with preserving and protecting the resource from de-
pletion and thus invoked these measures in the name of conservation.87
Third, the shellfish are being destroyed by pollution, by waterfront
development projects, by non-Indian over-harvesting, and by the in-
troduction of shellfish predators. The resultant resource depletion,
when coupled with state prohibition of off-reservation crab and shrimp
harvests and state-imposed time, area, and gear restrictions, has the
combined effect of exerting extreme harvest pressure on the few re-
84. Id. at 14.
85. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisqually et al., art. III, 10
Stat. 1132.
85. Northwest Indian Fishery Comm'n, Shellfish-The Tribal Perspective 5 (1989)
(unpublished report).
87. Joint Tribal Statement Re: Status Conference of September 13, 1989, at Sub-
proceeding 89-3: Tribal Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Re: Shellfish,
United States v. Washinpton. Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. filed Sent. 18. 1970).
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maining public tidelands.88 These areas cannot support these harvesting
activities and survive.
Once the privately-owned tidelands are subtracted from the amount
of tidelands available, and the contaminated, inaccessible, and unsuit-
able tidelands are no longer available, the tideland available to the
tribes is extremely limited.s9 At present this limited space is open to
the general public, both Indian and non-Indian. Bill Frank, Jr., chair-
man of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, has asserted that
"the shellfish resources that belong to all were never intended to be
put in the private hands of a few individuals who own beachfront
property.''"9
While Washington I addressed the allocation issue with regard to
anadromous species, it failed to consider non-anadromous species. The
district court, in exercising continuing jurisdiction over the case, en-
tered a compilation of major post-trial substantive orders. 9' The court
held that:
In order to be entitled to exercise off-reservation treaty
fishing rights to nonanadromous fish and shellfish, any tribe
party to this case shall, prior to any attempt to exercise
such rights, present prima facie evidence and arguments
supporting its claim to treaty entitlements to such nonan-
adromous fish and shellfish upon which the court may make
a preliminary determination as to the tribe's entitlement to
such species, pending final determination of tribal treaty-
right entitlement to nonanadromous fish and shell-
fish .... 92
For the last four years, the Washington Department of Fisheries
and the Puget Sound tribes have been successfully negotiating shellfish
agreements. Much progress has been made as evidenced by the state's
growing awareness of all that the tribes have to offer. Tribal involve-
ment means another source of resource management funding and adds
teeth to habitat protection schemes in that such schemes are now based
on judicially recognized treaty rights.93
Despite the notable progress in negotiations, agreement has not been
possible. The state refuses to open to Indians tidelands that are pri-
vately owned or leased by the state. The parties waited hoping some-
thing would break the impasse. In the meantime, tribal members
88. Id.
89. Tribes Seek Ruling on Treaty Shellfish Rights, NEws (Northwest Indian Fisheries
Comm'n), vol. 15, no. 3, 1989, at 5.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
92. Id. at 1037.
93. Interview with Steve Robinson, Public Relations Officer, Northwest Indian
ichrc nmme~nn Alrnn, Wnehnatnn (Anr 9 1Qflln
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harvesting shellfish in Kitsap County were being harassed and threat-
ened by property owners, being prosecuted in state courts, and having
their boats and harvesting gear seized. Four Suquamish and Port
Gamble Klallam tribal members were arrested by Kitsap County law
enforcement officials for harvesting shellfish at off-reservation sites.9 4
Initially these were characterized as civil rights cases filed on their
own behalf in federal court.95 Concerned that the shellfish issue would
be tried there, in cases the treaty tribes are not a party to, the tribes
took control of the cases. The treaty tribes filed suit in federal district
cournt to request a determination that they may exercise off-reservation
treaty fishing rights for shellfish.96 The tribal request for declaratory
and injunctive relief regarding shellfish asks the court to declare:
(1) that all species of shellfish found within the tribes
usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations are within
the "right of taking fish" reserved by the Stevens treaties;
(2) that the shellfish treaty right is limited only by (a) the
need to perpetuate a species (with an appropriate margin
of safety), (b) the provision for sharing the resource with
all non-Indian citizens pursuant to the "in common with"
language of the treaties, and (c) the exclusion of "beds,
staked or cultivated by citizens," as that phrase would have
been understood by the Indians at treaty time; and
(3) that neither ownership nor possession of tidelands or
bedlands by the state or private parties, through sale, lease
or otherwise, may defeat, interfere with or diminish tribal
treaty shellfish harvesting rights, nor bar access to tidelands
or bedlands for harvesting purposes.Y
Very little has occurred since the filing. There are two major pro-
cedural disputes that are awaiting a decision by the judge. Everything
else is on hold until those issues are decided.98 But this could simply
be the calm before the storm. The conflict and controversy surrounding
this dispute is expected to reach the fever pitch reached in the district
court's hearing of United States v. Washington. After all, the private
owners of the tidelands in question are more coherent and better
94. Tribes Sue for Fishing Rights on Private Lands, MORNING NEWS TRIE. (Olympia,
Wash.), May 21, 1989, at col. 2.
95. See Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1991) (Indians claiming
unreasonable arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, interference with treaty rights,
and denial of equal protection by the county).
96. Joint Tribal Statement Re: Status Conference of Sept. 13, 1989, at Subpro-
ceeding 89-3: Tribal Request for a Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Re: Shellfish,
United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9217 (W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 18, 1970).
97. Id., Subproceeding 89-3 at 1-2.
98. Interview with Phillip Katzen, supra note 72.
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organized than the commercial and sport fishers and collectively possess
a considerable amount of political influence.9
The private tideland owners fear that if the tribes prevail, the value
of their property will diminish.' ° This fear is mistakenly premised on
the belief that the tribes will harvest the shellfish to the point of
extinction. Since the tribes harvest shellfish by hand, the impact on
the resource is a fraction of the impact exerted by the non-Indian
mechanized harvesting technique. The resource would be in better
hands if the tribes cared for it. The tribes are the leaders in habitat
protection and give enhancement efforts the highest priority. Their
goal is to increase the viability of the resource. Washington State has
commented that if forty acres of Puget Sound tidelands were enhanced,
the amount of clams available would be quadrupled.' 0' As with the
fishery resource, the tribes strive for the long-term viability of the
resource and have the resource management funding and the treaty
based power to protect the habitat. Therefore, if the commercial
growers, recreational harvesters, and Washington State residents are
seriously interested in having clams in this state, then the tribes are
the best friends to have.
V. Critical Evaluation
Washington H has significantly increased the tribal share of the fish
resource over what they harvested immediately prior to the original
1974 Washington I decision. In recent years prior to 1974, Washington
Indians were harvesting less than 2% of the fish, whereas now the
tribes collectively harvest 50% of the resource.'2 As a result, Wash-
ington I has been touted a legal victory for the tribes. 03 Others, such
as Joseph Pavel, do not see the case as a major legal victory bestowing
on the tribes a windfall of fish or money. He sees the case as simply
providing tribes with a choice to fish for a living or not to fish for a
living.104
Clearly the conflict and the controversy is not over. What the
decision did do, though, was change the character of the disputes. As
noted earlier in this article, the disputes are no longer state versus
tribe; the majority are inter-tribal and intra-tribal. Washington II has,
99. Interview with Gill Pauley, Chair of the Fisheries Advisory Board (Apr. 26,
1990).
100. Interview with Barbara Lindsay, Executive Director of the United Property
Owners of Washington (Apr. 27, 1990).
101. Interview with Steve Robinson, supra note 93.
102. Interview with Phillip Katzen, supra note 72.
103. Interview with Mason Morrisett (May 2, 1990); Interview with Steve Robinson,
supra note 93; Interview with Phillip Katzen, supra note 72.
104. Interview with Joseph Pavel, Fisheries Biologist, Northwest Indian Fisheries
Commission (May 2, 1990).
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in leffect, pitted tribe against tribe, 05 while the issues that are in dispute
are the very same issues that were disputed pre-Washington I -
allocation disputes.
Every dispute that is currently pending boils down to a basic allo-
cation dispute. Disputes of this nature will inevitably increase in terms
of frequency apad degree of animosity as the resource diminishes fur-
ther. These disputes could have been avoided if the court had not
made some basic mistakes.
Washington II is more correctly viewed as a short-term fix rather
than a long-term solution. The treaty tribes have gained a right to
50% of the dwindling resource at the intolerable expense of a complete
denial of traditional tribal fishing methods and systems, and at the
expense of ensuring the long-term viability of the resource. "Without
further clear and consistent guidance, the court victories claimed by
any side in this controversy will be truly empty. For while the treaties
are litigated and relitigated in court, constructive long-range planning
suffers, the fish stocks dwindle, and everyone loses."'0
The following sections will examine where the court went astray in
the decision, why these mistakes are extremely detrimental to all tribes,
how the tribes are impacted, and what the future holds for the tribes
of Washington State.
A. The Nature of Indian Fishery Management Systems
Traditionally, Washington tribes managed fish through a proprietary
fish tenure system that was based on ecosystem management principles.
Under this system all the fishing sites were distributed among family
groupings within the tribe. Such a fish tenure system effectively estab-
lished a proprietary interest in the actual fishing site. Each family or
tribe privately owned that particular harvesting site or ground where
the stocks seasonally congregate.
This tenure system also served to distribute income within the tribe,
thereby maintaining the class or social structure. While the site was
privately owned, the gear was publicly owned in that it was constructed
and maintained by the Indian community. For the river-based tribes,
one large net would block the river and the catch was distributed
according to the amount of effort put into preparation of the net for
the harvest. In these societies, the advantageous downstream sites were
usually reserved for high-ranking households. They acquired ownership
105. In competing for a dwindling resource, some federally recognized treaty tribes
are actively sabotaging other tribes' efforts to become federally recognized. The fewer
the number of federally recognized tribes, the greater the share of the 50% allocation
for those tribes.
106. Landau, supra note 11, at 456.
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of these more productive grounds as compensation for their extensive
public duties and heavy community responsibilities.107
For ocean-based tribes, points of land that jut out into strategic
marine migration paths were distributed among the main families of
the tribe. The families that owned these sites also owned the gear used
for harvesting and owned the catch. The harvest would be distributed
among the family members and any nonmember that chose to help.
This system was far more rank conscious than the river-based tribal
system.
The simple fact that ownership of specific sites was vested in families
provided them with a right to prevent others from preying on the
stock elsewhere. Ownership of site then ensured ownership of the fish
that returned. The owner had a vested interest in ensuring the long-
term viability of the resource by protecting the ground's capital value.
Survival of the stocks that seasonally pass through it was thus ensured.
The district court recognized the tribes engaged in both fixed site
or land-based fishing and marine zone fishing. When interpreting the
provision that reserved the tribes the right to fish at "all usual and
accustomed grounds and stations," the court recognized that the words
"grounds" and "stations" indicate two different approaches to fishing:
"Stations" indicates fixed locations such as the site of a
fish weir or a fishing platform or some other narrowly
limited area; "grounds" indicates larger areas which may
contain numerous stations and other unspecified locations
which in the urgency of treaty negotiations could not then
have been determined with specific precision and cannot
now be so determined. 08
Further, the court recognized that salmon and other anadromous
species are the largest component of aboriginal tribal fisheries;'09 that
the most strategic location for harvesting anadromous fish is in river
mouths;" 0 that the tribes relied heavily on the use of fixed, riparian
gear;"' and that the Indian fisheries are largely place-oriented." 2 While
the court recognized all these elements, the court failed to link them
together and understand them in relation to the broader context.
By not drawing all these pieces together, the court overlooked the
fact that fixed sites were established for anadromous fisheries, and
107. Russel L. Barsh, The Economics of a Traditional Coastal Indian Salmon
Fishery, 42 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 170, 171 (1982).
108. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 332.
109. Id. at 406.
110. Id. at 352.
111. Id. at 384.'
112. Id.
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that marine zones were established for non-anadromous fisheries." 3
This distinction is critical. Since a trap fishery is, by design, private
property and a marine fishery is open and common to all fishers, it
is logical that the tribes agreed to fish "in common with" non-Indians
for non-anadromous species, and it is meaningless to describe a trap
fishery as "common." If traps are not protected from marine com-
petition, its special economic value is lost. Stemming from this over-
sight, Judge Boldt crafted his decision based on the mistaken assumption
that tribal proprietary fishery management systems are based on the
same theoretical underpinnings as the common property approach
practiced by the state.
B. Reason Indians Were Excluded from the Fishery
Marine competition accelerated from the 1890s to the 1920s when
non-Indian settlers flocked to the region and began large-scale devel-
opment of the commercial fishing industry. In jockeying for a better
fishing position, the fishers leapfrogged over one another gradually
moving further offshore. As the non-Indians were moving further
offshore to remain ahead of the other fishers, the tribes remained at
their river mouth, land-based site, waiting for their fish to return. The
stocks at that time were enormous, so there was little negative impact.
Eventually, the stocks could not bear the extreme harvesting pressure
and their numbers began to dwindle. Marine predation reduces the
total number of fish everywhere along the migration path. Increases
in offshore harvesting efforts means decreases in onshore harvesting
activities because fewer fish survive to return to the rivers. This explains
why the tribes were effectively cut off and excluded from the fishery.
The court, unfortunately, did not even consider why the tribes failed
to compete successfully in this ever-evolving offshore marine fishery.
In stating that "employment acculturation of the Indians has been a
major cause of the drastic decline from treaty times of the number of
Indians engaged in fishing,"" 4 the court leaves the impression that
Indians chose not to fish in preference to other forms of employment.
To be sure, many Indians did stop fishing and found jobs within the
dominant society, but this change in employment was due to necessity.
It was truly the offshore marine fishing technique employed by the
non-Indians that was instrumental in tribal exclusion from the fishery.
C. Court-Ordered Remedy
Washington I stated that off-reservation fishing by non-Indians "is
not a right but merely a privilege which may be granted, limited, or
113. RUSSEL L. BARSH, THE WASHINGTON FISHING RIHTS CONTROVERSY: AN Eco-
NOMIC CRITIQUE 44 (1977).
114. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 358.
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withdrawn by the state as the interests of the state or the exercise of
treaty fishing rights may require. ' 1 5 The court further ruled that the
treaties reserve for the Washington tribes a treaty right to fish, not a
mere or simple privilege to fish. It is important to note that the court
did not mean a right to the fish itself, but rather the right to the
opportunity to engage in fishing itself. The right simply extends to the
opportunity, rather than the property.
Under the tribal fishery management scheme, various Indians owned
the fish. That ownership allowed them to exclude others from fishing
their stocks, and provided the owner with incentive to be a careful
steward and ensure the long-term viability of those particular returning
stocks. But in only recognizing a tribal right to the opportunity to
take off-reservation fish, the court approved the state's regulatory
scheme, which includes the elimination of private ownership of sites
and stocks. Therefore, if the Indian attempts to realize this right to
fish, the fisherman must be willing and able to fish as the non-Indians
fish and also must now compete within that foreign common-property
system. As Russel L. Barsh notes, "[Tihe court has implicitly ratified
the state's taking of the value of tribal off-reservation trap sites and
compensated tribes by increasing their share of a less efficient, pre-
dominantly marine state fishery.""16
Further, the remedy did not consider the financial status of most
tribes of the region at that time. Since the remedy provides Indians
an equal opportunity to fish rather than an equal share of the proceeds
of the fishery, it assumes Indians enjoy equal access to capital. For
the Indians to take full advantage of the remedy, they must invest in
additional gear. But if the real explanation for their lost harvesting
amounts has been an inability to finance gear to compete with the
growing non-Indian industry, then the court's remedy changes nothing.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) now provides tribes with sub-
sidized loans to buy boats and other necessary gear. While this loan
program has answered the past problem of limited capital, it has
created a new problem. Today, the problem for most tribes is becoming
one of overcapitalization, a problem the non-Indian fishery has been
faced with for many years. According to Gill Pauley, current chair of
the Fisheries Advisory Board, the Makah Tribe may already be over-
capitalized in that they cannot get access to enough fish to pay for
the BIA boat loans." 7
D. How Are the Tribes Affected?
If the court had clearly understood the facts that (1) tribal anad-
romous fishery is land-based, and (2) offshore fishing technique caused
115. Id. at 332.
116. BARsH, supra note 113, at 45 (emphasis in original).
117. Interview with Gill Pauley, supra note 99.
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the decline in Indian harvests, then its legal conclusions would have
been different. Had these facts been considered, most of the current
conflicts referred to earlier in this article would have been avoided
and the ruling would have been far more beneficial for the tribes
overall. The most devastating effect of this decision was the court's
implicit denial of a tribal land-based proprietary, anadromous fishery.
By denying the Indian approach to fishery management, the court
affirmed the non-Indian common property approach to fishery man-
agement. Tribes must now compete with non-Indian fishers in a non-
Indian fishery system - a system foreign to Indian methods and far
more inefficient economically.
The fishery resource is the bedrock of the Washington tribes' culture.
The primary function of the Indian tenure system was to manage
effectively the resource, but it was also instrumental in distributing
income within the tribe which ultimately maintained and enforced
tribal social structure. By disaffirming tribal fishery systems and forc-
ing tribes to fish offshore as non-Indians, the court has launched a
deadly blow attacking the very foundation upon which tribal culture
and society is based and structured. Whether intentional or not, the
effect is clear: tribal societies are being forced to change. Tribes are
placed in a no-win situation. If tribes continue to fish, then they must
fish according to non-Indian systems, foreign to their culture, and thus
they must adapt socially and culturally to this new approach. If the
tribes refuse to adapt to non-Indian methods, they are effectively
denied the ability to fish altogether, thereby destroying the traditional
lifestyle and culture. The choice is assimilation or obliteration.
This decision ultimately serves to assimilate tribes into the non-
Indian fishing culture and to undermine the legitimacy of the very
claim the tribes are making. While the decision upholds a tribal right
to regulate their off-reservation fishery, it is wholly contingent on the
tribes' willingness and ability to adopt the governmental forms and
structures of the dominant society. Before a tribe can exercise off-
reservation fishing rights, it must establish to the satisfaction of either
the State Department of Fisheries, or the court, that the tribe meets
certain qualifications." 8 These qualifications include competent and
responsible leadership, well-organized tribal government, Indian per-
sonnel trained for and competent to provide effective enforcement of
all tribal fishing regulations, well-qualified experts in fishery science
and management either on the tribal staff or readily available to the
tribe, and an officially approved tribal membership role." 9 By ration-
alizing the management of the Indian fishery in this way, the court is
simply recreating the relationships of the dominant society. The court
118. Washington 1, 384 F. Supp. at 333, 340.
119. Id. at 340-41.
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does not see this rationalized control and management as an imposition
of external values.
D. What Are the Long-Term Implications?
In 1965, Garrett Hardin labelled the problem all marine fisheries
face as "the tragedy of the commons.' ' 120 Marine fisheries are common
goods because they cannot be reduced to individual ownership while
in the ocean and must therefore belong to everyone (that is, if they
are to be considered property at all). Individual ownership does vest,
though, at the moment the animal is captured. The tragedy presents
itself to economists jn the form of a diseconomy and to environmen-
talists as overexploitation of the resource.
The diseconomy is the duplication of harvesting effort exercised by
the fishers which results because no one pursuing a particular school
of fish can exclude the other fishers until the fish are caught. All
fishers bear search and pursuit costs, but only one fisher benefits. The
other diseconomy that flows from this rule of capture is a reduced
economic value of the fish. The capturer must either kill the prey,
whereupon its value will begin to deteriorate, or sustain its life at some
cost. The fish cannot remain at large until the best opportunity to
market it.
Overexploitation is inevitable with common property resources. Since
the resource is owned by all, there are no restrictions on who can
harvest it. All owners have equal use rights. The system is based on
competitive free enterprise principles, so it is not in the fishers best
interests to save fish until they are larger or to act in any way to
ensure adequate resource conservation and effectively promote the
long-term economic viability. Clearly, no fisher gains by foregoing
early harvests of smaller fish in favor of later forays, since others may
fully harvest the undersized stocks. Fish then become "everybody's
property and nobody's responsibility.'1'
Reflecting on the problem common property resources present, a
state commission in 1919 complained that "the greed for fish makes
cradle robbers of many of our fishermen."'12 But at what point do
fishers stop engaging in this activity? Scott Gordon showed that the
fishery could be expected to achieve a "bionomic equilibrium" at
which point net economic revenue was zero.' 23 The more valuable the
120. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-48
(1968).
121. Stanton Patty, Canada Working for Continental Shelf Limit on Fishing, SEAT-
TLE TImS, Dec. 3, 1970, at 18.
122. 10 REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES 1917-1919,
at 28-29.
123. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource:
The Fishery, 62 J. POL. EcON. 124-42 (1954).
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catch, relative to the cost of fishing, the greater the resulting level of
exploitation and of depletion of the stock. Therefore, unless strictly
regulated, effort tends to expand to a level at which net economic
benefits to fishers are entirely dissipated.'2
Gordon's model suggests ways to solve this problem. First, control
the fishing effort directly by limiting entry. Second, impose royalties
on the fish harvest that would capture resource revenue for the public
at large. Third, convert the open access fishery harvest into a property
rights system. 1' None of these solutions have been attempted in Wash-
ington State. 12 6
In Washington State, the traditional response has been what Pro-
fessor Crutchfield aptly refers to as regulation by inefficiency. 2, As
"inefficiency experts,"'' fishery managers use time and area closures,
gear restrictions, and species restriction, in an attempt to ameliorate
the destructive effects fishers have on the common resource. But while
annual quotas, season closures, and gear restrictions may prove ade-
quate to reduce fishing mortality and maintain fish populations, these
traditional regulations do not restrain the incentives to "race for fish"
by expanding fishing capacity. 29
Colin Clark, of the University of British Columbia, concludes "that
achievement of satisfactory levels of economic efficiency is probably
impossible unless some form of exclusive property rights or appropriate
substitute, can be established with respect to the fishery resource."' 30
This conclusion supports the third solution Scott Gordon identified in
1957, and is recognized in most academic circles to be the ultimate
solution to the tragic problem of the commons.
Property rights-based systems to fisheries management are superior
to common property-based systems because they focus on economic
efficiency, thereby ensuring the long-term liability of the resource. The
Indian fishery management scheme is a property rights-based system.
The Indian land-based anadromous fishery is far more efficient because
the gear required is far less expensive and complicated, the gear is
fixed and does not require labor to operate, the salmon are fully
124. See appendix 2 of this article for a graphic display of Gordon's model.
125. Id.
126. Following Gordon's first solution, Canada has limited entry into the Pacific
Ocean fishery. While this was politically very difficult to install, it has proven to be
successful in protecting the resource while maximizing its economic return.
127. See JAMrS A. CRUTCHFIELD & Gruuo PONTEcoRvo, THE PACIFIC SALMON FISH-
ERIES: A STUDY OF IRRATIONAL CONSERVATION 127 (1969).
128. Ralph W. Johnson, Regulation of Commercial Salmon Fishermen - A Case of
Confused Objective, PAC. NORTHWEST Q. 141, 142 (1964).
129. DANIEL HUPPERT, LIMITED ACCESS ALTERNATIVES FOR THE PACIFIC GROUNDFISH
F~sI-m-Y 38 (National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration Technical Report No. 52,
1987).
130. Colin Clark, Optimization Theory and Fishery Management 43 (unpublished
paper) (n.d.) (available from the University of British Columbia).
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matured and therefore at their largest size when caught, and there are
no search costs because the salmon always return to the natal stream.
Land-based methods utilizing traps and weirs can be operated at 3%Wo
to 5% of the cost of any marine method.' The other benefit is that
the trap owner has a high degree of control over the escapement
necessary to ensure a healthy and abundant stock next year. Even
beyond these economic benefits, land-based fishing really makes in-
tuitive sense. As Ralph Johnson observes, "hunting for salmon on the
high seas is like chasing bees in a meadow. Why not wait until the
bees return to the hive, or until the salmon return to their spawning
stream?"132
The court in Washington II missed an opportunity to uphold the
integrity of tribal culture and to ensure the abundance of the salmon
resource. If the court had only affirmed the tribal approach to salmon
management, it would be validating a far more efficient property-
based system. Of course, a land-based fishery is only useful and
effective if all marine harvesting activity is eliminated. As we have
seen, the court failed to take this initiative. Is such an action within
the court's discretion? Is this the function of the court?
VI. Conclusion
Legal scholars become concerned when the judiciary is faced with
disputes which entail redistribution of an extremely valuable neutral
resource. They are skeptical of the judiciary's capacity and ability to
make sound decisions of this nature. Since these decisions have the
potential of redistributing wealth, they expect resistance to any decision
is likely. This resistance, in turn, increases the probability that the
decision will be deflected into unanticipated channels and distorted in
some perverse and unjust manner. The courts, some scholars contend
further, are ill-suited to predict and control such consequences and
even less suited to monitoring the results of their decisions. So that
ultimately, given its inherent incapacities, the court in trying to "do
right" is likely to "do wrong." The problem, as Donald Horowitz
sees it, is rooted in the adjudicative process itself:
Horowitz suggests that judicial capacity is limited by the
nature of its personnel, who are generalists unsuited to
processing specialized information and who tend to be iso-
lated from the social milieu, and by the nature of the
process, which is focused on rights and duties and is piece-
meal, passive, lacking in fact-finding capability, and without
provision for policy review. 33
131. Johnson, supra note 128, at 141.
132. Id.
133. Rita Bruun, The Boldt Decision: Legal Victory, Political Defect, 4 L. & POL'Y
Q. 271, 274 (1982) (construing DONALD HOROWrZ, Ti COURT AND SOCIAL POLICY
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U7ited States v. Washington is clearly one of those disputes that
concern legal scholars. A neutral and extremely valuable fishery re-
source was the focus of the dispute and treaty allocation rights was
the central issue. Judge Boldt seemed to be aware, at least, of some
of the inherent limits of the court in dealing with such a case. He
clearly made a conscious effort to overcome these problems.
First, special effort was made to collect as much factual information
as possible on every area of concern. As Judge Boldt explained:
For more than three years ... plaintiffs and defendants
have conducted exhaustive research in anthropology, biol-
ogy, fishery managements and other fields of expertise, and
have also made extreme efforts to find and present by
witnesses and exhibits as much information as possible that
pertains directly or indirectly to each issue in the case.'3 4
Second, Judge Boldt worked at facilitating feedback from all af-
fected parties and provided a forum in which they could express their
concerns. The court suggested that:
.. so far as possible, all tribes, agencies or organizations
having or claiming direct or indirect justifiable interest in
treaty fishing rights ... be brought into the case either as
parties or as amicus curiae; and that every issue of sub-
stantial direct or indirect significance to the contentions of
any party be raised and adjudicated in this case.'35
This approach helped him identify and clarify the dimensions and
content of the problem.
Third, in anticipation of problems in implementing its decision, the
court maintained continuing jurisdiction after deciding the case. Rec-
ognizing his lack of knowledge in the area of fishery science manage-
ment, he appointed an expert and a special master to assist the court
and the disputants in problems, questions, or other disputes flowing
from the decision.
Exercise of continuing jurisdiction by a court is certainly not new
or unusual. This remedy, however, is usually utilized in school deseg-
regation cases. The increasing volume of cases involving environmental
and natural resource issues suggests a growing role for the courts as
administrative resource managers. As Judge Burns observed in his
concurrence affirming Washington I,
any decision by us to affirm also involves ratification of
the role of the district judge as a "perpetual fishmaster."
134. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 328-29.
135. Id.
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Although I recognize that district judges cannot escape their
constitutional responsibilities, however unusual and contin-
uing duties imposed upon them, I deplore situations that
make it necessary for us to become enduring managers of
the fisheries, forests, and highways, to say nothing of school
districts, policy departments, and so on. 36
Before any agency can function properly, it must, at a minimum, have
comprehensive jurisdiction, fixed lines of authority, effective means of
enforcement, and resources to finance its activities. Courts do not
have such means or resources and should, therefore, not move too
hastily to assume comprehensive regulatory authority in a particular
case.
Even with these extra efforts to overcome the problems disputes of
this sort present for the court, it still made three fundamental mistakes.
First, the court misunderstood that Indian anadromous fishery tech-
niques are land-based and proprietary in nature. Second, it mistakenly
assumed that Indians were excluded from the fishery due to employ-
ment acculturation. Third, based upon these two mistakes, the court
designed a remedy inappropriate for the tribes. The remedy not only
validates the dysfunctional state fishery, but it forces tribes to compete
within this foreign system and fish in the same way non-Indians fish.
But before capital poor tribes can enter the already overcapitalized
state system, they must purchase boats and gear.
The optimal solution to United States v. Washington would have
been allocation of sites and establishment of tradeable property rights
in the sites, creating exclusivity, and a firm and perpetual division of
wealth, thereby increasing the aggregate value of the resource for all
parties. But the solution crafted by the court is less effective and
involves far less change in the current state of affairs.
The matter has been dealt with most preceptively by Rita Bruun,
who stated in a 1982 article that given the nature of the dispute and
the inherent limits and constraints the court faces, "it is at least
plausible that the [inadequacies of the decision and] the difficulties
that have followed the Boldt decision are not the result of the court's
failure to grasp the dimensions of the problem, but a function of the
dimensions themselves."'' 3 7 She continues:
Perhaps ... the adjudicative process is too focused for
rational policymaking. The court here focused on the rights
and duties of the parties involved. Questions of rights tend
to be considered absolute rather than utilitarian. As such,
though the court heard from most interested parties, it could
136. 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975) (Bums, J., concurring).
137. Bruun, supra note 133, at 275.
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not consider an array of policy alternatives to maximize
benefits for all parties.'
While the court would have found it difficult politically to justify
"any policy that deviated greatly from either the 50% the tribes were
claiming on the basis of treaty language or the absence of any right
at all beyond the simple equal access that the senate was claiming,' ' 39
it does not preclude it from considering other policy alternatives
altogether.
Nevertheless, it seems that Judge Boldt could not imagine
a management program that did not adhere to liberal values,
such as efficient rule-centered management and accounta-
bility. The result of this failure of vision is likely to be an
undermining of the very basis of tribal existence from within,
as the tribes come to rely more and more on culturally
foreign scientists, accountants, lawyers, and grant-proposal
writers.
As the internal structure of the tribes is increasingly
undermined, the legitimacy of their claims, which are based
on the distinctiveness of Indian culture, is also sabo-
taged ....
... [T]hus, the Indians find themselves in a devil's di-
lemma. Faced with deprivation and harassment, they have
little choice but to fight; in the act of fighting the battle is
lost. Rights-centered litigation that entails the twin dangers
of reaction and assimilation seems to hold little promise. It
is, to use Scheingold's words, "a strategy of desperation
rather than hope."'"4
138. Id.
139. Id. at 276.
140. Id. at 294-95 (quoting STuART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 7(1974)).
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APPENDIX I
TREATY WITH THE NISQUALLI, PUYALLUP, ETC., 1854.
Articles of agreement and convention made and concluded on the
Shenah-nam, or Medicine Creek, in the Territory of Washington, this
twenty-sixth day of December, in the year one thousand eight hundred
and fifty-four, by Isaac I. Stevens, governor and superintendent of
Indian affairs of the said Territory, on the part of the United States,
and the undersigned chiefs, head-men, and delegates of the Nisqually,
Puyallup, Steilacoom, Squawskin, S'Homamish, Stehchass. I Peeksin,
Squi-aitl, and Sa-heh-wamish tribes and bands of Indians, occupying
the lands lying round the head of Puget's Sound and the adjacent
inlets, who, for the purpose of this treaty, are to be regarded as one
nation, on behalf of said tribes and bands, and duly authorized by
them.
ARTICLE 1. The said tribes and bands of Indians hereby cede,
relinquish, and convey to the United States, all their right, title, and
interest in and to the lands and country occupied by them, bounded
and described as follows, to wit: Commencing at the point on the
eastern side of Admiralty Inlet, known as Point Pully, about midway
between Commencement and Elliott Bays; thence running in a south-
easterly direction, following the divide between the waters of the
Puyallup and Dwamish, or White Rivers, to the summit of the
Cascade Mountains; thence southerly, along the summit of said range
to a point opposite the main source of the Skookum Chuck Creek;
thence to and down said creek, to the coal mine; thence northwesterly,
to the summit of the Black Hills; thence northerly, to the upper forks
of the Satsop River; thence northeasterly, through the portage known
Wilkes's Portage, to Point Southworth, on the western side of Ad-
miralty Inlet; thence around the foot of Vasbon's Island, easterly
and southeasterly, to the place of beginning.
ARTICLE 2. There is, however, reserved for the present use and
occupation of the said tribes and bands, the following tracts of land,
viz: The small island called Klah-che-min, situated opposite the mouths
of Hammersley's and Totten's Inlets, and separated from Hartstene
Island by Peale's Passage, containing about two sections of land by
estimation; a square tract containing two sections, or twelve hundred
and eighty acres, lying on the south side of Commencement Bay; all
which tracts shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed
and marked out for their exclusive use; nor shall any white man be
permitted to reside upon the same without permission of the tribe
and the superintendent or agent. And the said tribes and bands agree
to remove to and settle upon the same within one year after the
ratification of this treaty, or sooner if the means are furnished them.
In the mean time, it shall be lawful for them to reside upon any
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United States, and upon any ground claimed or occupied, if with the
permission of the owner or claimant. If necessary for the public
convenience, roads may be run through their reserves, and, on the
other hand, the right of way with free access from the same to the
nearest public highway is secured to them.
ARTICLE 3. The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed
grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians in common
with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses
for the purpose of curing, together with the privilege of hunting,
gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses on open and
unclaimed lands: Provided, however, that they shall not take shellfish
from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens, and that they shall
alter all stallions not intended for breeding-horses, and shall keep up
and confine the latter.
ARTICLE 4. In consideration of the above session, the United
States agree to pay to the said tribes and bands the sum of thirty-
two thousand five hundred dollars, in the following manner, that is
to say: For the first year after the ratification hereof, three thousand
two hundred and fifty dollars; for the next two years, three thousand
dollars each year; for the next three years, two thousand dollars each
year; for the next four years fifteen hundred dollars each year; for
the next five years twelve hundred dollars each year; and for the
next five years twelve hundred dollars each years; and for the next
five years one thousand dollars each year; all which said sums of
money shall be applied to the use and benefit of the said Indians,
under the direction of the President of the United States, who may
from time to time determine, at his discretion, upon what beneficial
objects to expend the same. And the superintendent of Indian affairs,
or other proper officer, shall each year inform the President of the
wishes of said Indians in respect thereto.
ARTICLE 5. To enable the said Indians to remove to and settle
upon their aforesaid reservations, and to clear, fence, and break up
a sufficient quantity of land for cultivation, the United States further
agree to pay the sum of three thousand two hundred and fifty dollars,
to be laid out and expended under the direction of the President,
and in such manner as he shall approve.
ARTICLE 6. The President may hereafter, when in his opinion
the interests of the Territory may require, and the welfare of the
said Indians be promoted, remove them from either or all of said
reservations to such other suitable place or places within said Terri-
tory as he may deem fit, on remunerating them for their improve-
ments and the expenses of their removal, or may consolidate them
with other friendly tribes or bands. And he may further, at his
discrelion, cause the whole or any portion of the lands hereby re-
served, or of such other land as may be selected in lieu thereof, to
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be surveyed into lots, and assign the same to such individuals or
families as are willing to avail themselves of the privilege, and will
locate on the same as a permanent home, on the same terms and
subject to the same regulations as are provided in the sixth article
of the treaty with the Omahas, so far as the same may be applicable.
Any substantial improvements heretofore made by any Indian, and
which he shall be compelled to abandon in consequence of this treaty,
shall be valued under the direction of the President, and payment be
made accordingly therefor.
ARTICLE 7. The annuities of the aforesaid tribes and bands shall
not be taken to pay the debts of individuals.
ARTICLE 8. The aforesaid tribes and bands acknowledge their
dependence on the Government of the United States, and promise to
be friendly with all citizens thereof, and pledge themselves to commit
no depredations on the property of such citizens. And should any
one or more of them violate this pledge, and the fact be satisfactorily
proved before the agent, the property taken shall be returned, or in
default thereof, or if injured or destroyed, compensation may be
made by the Government out of their annuities. Nor will they make
war on any other tribe except in self-defence, but will submit all
matters of difference between them and other Indians to the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or its agent, for decision, and abide
thereby. And if any of the said Indians commit any depredations on
any other Indians within the Territory, the same rule shall prevail as
that prescribed in this article, in cases of depredations against citizens.
And the said tribes agree not to shelter or conceal offenders against
the laws of the United States, but to deliver them up to the authorities
for trial.
ARTICLE 9. The above tribes and bands are desirous to exclude
from their reservations the use of ardent spirits, and to prevent their
people from drinking the same; and therefore it is provided, that
any Indian belonging to said tribes, who is guilty of bringing liquor
into said reservations, or who drinks liquor, may have his or her
proportion of the annuities withheld from him or her for such time
as the President may determine.
ARTICLE 10. The United States further agree to establish at the
general agency for the district of Puget's Sound, within one year from
the ratification hereof, and to support, for a period of twenty years, an
agricultural and industrial school, to be free to children of the said tribes
and bands, in common with those of the other tribes of said district,
and to provide the said school with a suitable instructor or instructors,
and also to provide a smithy and carpenter's shop, and furnish them
with the necessary tools, and employ a blacksmith, carpenter, and farmer,
for the term of twenty years, to instruct the Indians in their respective
occupations. And the United States further agree to employ a physician
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
to reside at the said central agency, who shall furnish medicine and
advice to their sick, and shall vaccinate them; the expenses of the said
school, shops, employees, and medical attendance, to be defrayed by the
United States, and not deducted from the annuities.
ARTICLE 11. The said tribes and bands agree to free all slaves not
held by them, and not to purchase or acquire others hereafter.
ARTICLE 12. The said tribes and bands finally agree not to trade at
Vancouver's Island, or elsewhere our of the dominions of the United
States; nor shall foreign Indians be permitted to reside in their reserva-
tions without consent of the superintendent or agent.
ARTICLE 13. This treaty shall be obligatory on the contracting parties
as soon as the same shall be ratified by the President and Senate of the
United States.
In testimony whereof, the said Isaac I. Stevens, governor and super-
intendent of Indian Affairs, and the undersigned chiefs, headmen, and
delegates of the aforesaid tribes and bands, have hereunto set their bands
and seals at the place and on the day and year hereinbefore written.
Isaac I. Stevens, [L.S.]
Governor and Superintendent Territory of Washington.
Qui-ce-metl, his x mark.
Sno-ho-dumset, his x mark.
Lesh-high, his x mark.
Slip-o-elm, his x mark.
Kwi-ats, his x mark.
Stee-high, his x mark.
Di-a-keh, his x mark.
Hi-ten, his x mark.
Squa-la-hun, his x mark.
Kahk-tse-min, his x mark.
Sonan-o-yutl, his x mark.
Kl-tehp, his x mark.
Sahl-ko-min, his x mark.
T'bet-ste-heh-bit, his x mark.
Tcha-hoos-tan, his x mark.
Ke-cha-hat, his x mark.
Spee-peh, his x mark.
Swe-yah-tum, his x mark.
Cha-achsh, his x mark.
Pich-kehd, his x mark.
S'Klah-o-sum, his x mark.
Sah-le-tatl, his x mark.
See-lup, his x mark.
E-Ia-kah-ka, his x mark.
Slug-yeh, his x mark.
Hi-nuk, his x mark.
Ma-mo-nish, his x mark.
Cheels, his x mark.
Knutcanu, his x mark.
Bats-ta-kobe, his x mark.
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
[L.S.]
Klo-out, his x mark. [L.S.]
Se-uch-ka-nam, his x mark. [L.S.]
Ske-mah-han, his x mark. [L.S.]
Wuts-un-a-pum, his x mark. [L.S.]
Quuts-a-tadm, his x mark. [L.S.]
Quut-a-hen-msn, his x mark. [L.S.]
Yah-leh-chn, his x mark. [L.S.]
To-lahI-kut, his x mark. [L.S.]
Yul-lout, his x mark. [L.S.]
See-ahts-oot-soot, his x mark.[L.S.]
Ye-takho, his x mark. [L.S.]
We-po-it-ee, his x mark. [L.S.]
Kah-sid, his x mark. [L.S.]
La'h-hom-kan, his x mark. [L.S.]
Pah-how-at-ish, his x mark. [L.S.]
Swe-yehm, his x mark. [L.S.]
Sah-hwill, his x mark. [L.S.]
Se-kwaht, his x mark. [L.S.]
Kah-hum-kit, his x mark. [L.S.]
Yah-kwo-bah, his x mark. [L.S.]
Wut-sah-le-wun, his x mark. [L.S.]
Sah-ba-hat, his x mark. [L.S.]
Tel-e-kish, his x mark. [L.S.]
Swe-keh-nam, his x mark. [L.S.]
Sit-oo-ah, his x mark. [L.S.]
Ko-quel-a-cut, his x mark. [L.S.]
Jack, his x mark. [L.S.]
Keh-kise-bel-lo, his x mark. [L.S.]
Go-yeh-hn, his x mark. [L.S.]
Sah-putah, his x mark. [L.S.]
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Win-ne-ya, his x mark.
Executed in the presence ol
M.T. Simmons, Indian agent.
James Doty, secretary of the
commission.
C.H. Mason, secretary Washing-
ton Territory.
W.A. Slaughter, first lieutenant,
Fourth Infantry.
James McAlister
E. Giddings, jr.
George Shazer,
Henry D. Cock,
[L.S.] William, his x mark.
S.S. Ford, jr.,
John W. McAlister,
Clovington Cushman,
Peter Anderson,
Samuel Klady,
W.H. Pullen,
P.O. Hough,
E.R. Tyerall,
George Gibbs,
Benj. F.Shaw, interpreter,
Hazard Stevens.
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APPENDIX II
COST,
REVENUE($)
EFFORT
H.S. Gordon's (1954) theory of the common-property fishery.
In the absence of regulation, effort expands to E2, where total
cost = total revenue, and economic rents are "dissipated." The
(zero discount rate) optimum would be at effort level E,.
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